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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of trade with technical heterogeneity
amongst monopolistically competitive firms and countries. With free-entry, the existence of
technical asymmetries between firms leads to the endogenous determination of the
equilibrium average efficiency of the industry. It is shown that trade reduces (increases) the
minimum efficiency required to survive in the more (less) efficient country. This has
important welfare implications: (1) contrary to the constant elasticity of substitution
homogeneous firms model, through its effects on the efficiency composition of the industry,
trade affects welfare even when there is no love of variety, and (2) there are circumstances in
which trade liberalisation leads to a loss of consumer welfare.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The standard representative consumer monopolistic competition models of trade are based
on assumptions of homogeneity both between firms within countries and across countries.
These assumptions have two important consequences. First, trade liberalisation normally
results in symmetrically distributed market shares1. Second, trade is a source of welfare
gains, given its rationalising effects on industries (e.g. Smith and Venables, 1988) and the
increase in the number of varieties available for consumption it generates. Normally, these
gains are also symmetrically distributed between countries.
The assumptions of homogeneity on which these results rest, however, are at odds with
the existing evidence which suggests that  (1) inter-firm differences in performance  and
market shares are distinguishing features of real world industries and (2) a high degree of
specialisation still characterises the trade pattern of similar countries. For instance, Mueller
(1986) reports the existence of significant and persistent profitability differences among US
firms within industries. Cubbin and Geroski (1987) and Mueller (1990) confirm these results
for the UK and in a more recent study Oulton (1998) finds a wide dispersion of labour
productivity across UK companies within sectors.  At the international level, Dollar, Wolff,
and Baumol (1988) report a considerable variation across industrial countries in the value
added per-employee, and  Dollar and Wolff (1993)  find that industrial countries’ degree of
convergence of aggregate labour productivity to US levels is highly heterogeneous across
industries.
This paper constructs a theoretical model of trade in which monopolistically competitive
firms and countries are characterised by different efficiency levels2. The analysis is carried out
within a general equilibrium framework with  two similar but not identical countries. In each
country, there is a monopolistically competitive sector and a perfectly competitive one. In the
former, firms are characterised by asymmetric levels of cost efficiency. Countries are
identical in every respect but in the cost distribution of firms in the monopolistic sector. In
this sector, market structure is determined endogenously via free-entry and exit.  With
technical heterogeneity, this leads to a mechanism of competitive selection whereby the
efficiency of the marginal firm in the industry is determined endogenously. This implies that
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 The exceptions to this result stem from transport costs (Krugman, 1980) and/or from asymmetric
preferences (Venables, 1987, 1994).
2
 The effects of firm heterogeneity on market structure and profitability within a partial equilibrium, closed
economy, monopolistic competition model are analysed in Montagna (1995).
2the cost efficiency composition of the equilibrium population of firms is determined within
the model.
The endogenous determination of industry efficiency represents another channel,
alongside the number of varieties, through which trade may affect welfare. The opening up of
trade changes the competitive environment in which firms operate. This implies that in each
country trade modifies the efficiency structure of the equilibrium population of firms.  In
particular, we find that trade liberalisation reduces (increases) the minimum efficiency
required to survive in the more (less) efficient country.  Hence,  free trade has rationalising
effects on the structure of industry efficiency only in the less efficient country.
A second innovation of the model is to allow for different degrees of “love of variety”
(LOV). The preference for diversity plays a crucial role in the determination of the welfare
effects of trade in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of monopolistic competition. This
contrasts with monopolistically competitive macroeconomic models - e.g. Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987), Startz (1989) - where the number of product varieties has no effect on the
representative consumer’s indirect utility. Following Benassy (1996), we adopt a more
general specification of the utility function where the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) “love of
variety” and the “no love” are the two limiting special cases. This allows to highlight
interesting interactions between the efficiency and the variety effects of trade liberalisation.
In particular, we show that, contrary to the constant elasticity of substitution homogeneous
firms model, trade liberalisation – through its effects on the efficiency composition of the
industry – affects welfare even when there is no love of variety. Furthermore, the analysis
suggests that the adverse efficiency effects of trade for the more efficient country may result
in overall welfare losses if LOV is sufficiently low.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The autarkic equilibrium is analysed in
Section 2. Section 3 sets out the free trade model. The effects of trade on industry efficiency
are discussed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 analyse the pattern and the welfare effects of
trade, respectively. Section 7 draws some conclusions.
2. THE MODEL: AUTARKY
The model is developed in a general equilibrium framework with two countries called home
(h) and foreign (f). In each country there is an imperfectly competitive industry producing a
horizontally differentiated manufacturing good and a perfectly competitive industry
producing a homogeneous agricultural commodity. Labour is the only factor of production
3and is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the two sectors within each economy. We
assume that the two countries are endowed with the same quantity of labour.
2.1. Consumers
On the demand side, the two countries are identical in every respect. In each economy, there
is an aggregate representative household which has (i) a homothetic utility over a composite
differentiated manufacturing good jD  (j=h,f) and a homogeneous agricultural good jA  and
(ii) a CES sub-utility over varieties. The first stage of utility maximisation entails to solve the
following problem
(1)    
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where the price of the agricultural good (taken as the numeraire) is set to unity, jP  is the
price index of the differentiated bundle of goods, and jM  is aggregate income. The latter is
given by
(2)  jjjj LwM Π+= ,
where jw  is the economy wide wage rate, jL  is total labour endowment and jΠ  is total
profits in country j. The solution is given by the following demand functions:
(3)  jj M)1(A µ−= ,
(4)  
j
j
j P
M
D µ= .
We follow Benassy (1996) and adopt a representation of consumers’ preferences
over the varieties of the differentiated good which allows one to “disentangle” the taste for
4variety parameter from the degree of market power and substitutability between varieties.
This allows to distinguish situations where consumers do not value the number of varieties
per se, but perceive them as not being too close substitutes for each other, from others in
which preferences reward the availability of a large number of products regardless of the
degree of substitutability between them. Let λ∈ [0,1] be the constant parameter which
reflects the extent to which the CES quantity index explicitly incorporates the so-called “love
of variety ”. λ=0 and λ=1 correspond to the two extreme cases of “no love” and of
“maximum love” respectively (see Benassy, 1996, for details). Assuming a continuum of
varieties, the price and quantity indexes for the horizontally differentiated good with a range
jN  of varieties will then be defined as follows
(5)  
σ
σλ
−
+
−−




= ∫ 1
1
1N
1
1
ji
1
jj
j
diPNP ,
(6)  
11N
1
/)1(
ji
/)1(
jj
j
diDND
−
+
−−




= ∫ σ
σ
σσσλ
,
where jiP  and jiD  are price and consumption of the variety produced by firm i ∈[1, jN  +1]
in country j (j=h,f) respectively, and σ>1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between
varieties. Note that equations (5) and (6) imply that the “mass” of  available varieties in the
product space is equal to jN =( jN +1)-1. For expositional simplicity, henceforth we shall
refer to jN  as the “number” of varieties available in the industry.
In the second stage of utility maximisation the problem of the representative
consumer is to maximise (6) subject to ∫
+
=
1N
1
jijijj
j
diDPDP . The resulting demand for each
variety jiD  will be given by
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52.2. Agriculture
In both countries agriculture is perfectly competitive and produces a homogenous output
under conditions of constant returns to scale. Assuming unit labour requirements, the
production function of the agricultural good in country j is
(8) jAj AL = ,
where AjL  is the labour force employed in this sector. It follows that the zero-profit
condition in agriculture implies a unit wage, hence 1w j = .
2.3.  Industry
Firms in the differentiated industrial sector employ an increasing returns to scale technology
which uses labour as both fixed and variable input. Given that labour is perfectly mobile
within each economy, the nominal wage rate is determined in the agricultural sector. Hence,
the total cost function facing a typical firm i is
(9) jijiji QC βα += ,
where jiQ  is output and α and jiβ  are constant parameters denoting the fixed and marginal
labour requirements, respectively. The falling average cost gives rise to the incentive to
specialisation from which a one-to-one correspondence emerges between the number of
varieties and the number of firms in the industry. The fixed cost α is assumed to be identical
for all firms and across countries. Marginal costs of production, however, are assumed to be
firm-specific. Thus, we depart in this from the existing literature and assume that the
monopolistically competitive industry consists of firms that can be distinguished from each
other not only for the type of good they produce, but also on the basis of their efficiency3.
Within each country, let the first firm, i=1, be the most efficient one with respect to which all
other firms can be ranked.  In  order to capture the efficiency ranking of firms, we can then
define a continuous variable )i(jρ , such that )i(jji ρβ =  with jj )1( φρ = and 0)i(’j ≥ρ
for all i≥1.  For simplicity we also assume a monotonic ranking and an efficiency distribution
6with only one firm per efficiency level. This implies that within each country successive
entrants will be less efficient than incumbents are4. We shall assume that the distribution of
firms’ efficiencies is country-specific. For simplicity, let the “shape” of the marginal cost
distribution be the same for both economies, so that the two countries’ population of firms
will only differ in the level of efficiency of the most efficient firm. We shall therefore adopt
the following specific functional form for firms’ marginal costs δφρβ i)i( jjji == .   Thus,
)( fh φφ −  represents the efficiency gap between countries while δ determines the degree of
technical heterogeneity between firms and is assumed to be the same in both countries; δ=0
corresponds to the standard homogenous firms case.
Each firm chooses its price jiP   to maximise its profit, ignoring the effect of its action
on the industry price index. Given the cost function in (9) and assuming that jiji DQ =  for all
i, the profit of a typical firm i in country j is  αβΠ −−= jijijiji D)P( . This implies the
following optimal price rule:
(10)  jijiP ωβ= ,
where 
1−
=
σ
σ
ω  is the constant mark-up over marginal cost. Equation (10) suggests that -
for any given market structure – country j’s industry is characterised by an asymmetric
equilibrium spectrum of prices, quantities, market shares and profits distributed according to
the values of jiβ  with lower cost firms having larger market shares and higher profits.
Substituting (4), (7) and (10) into the profit function, the typical firm’s profit will be given by
(11)  αβµ
σ
ωΠ σσλ
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2.4. The free-entry equilibrium
In each country market structure in the monopolistically competitive industry is  determined
endogenously via free-entry. Note that, given the assumed ranking between firms, the larger
the number of firms characterising the equilibrium market structure the lower is the average
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 Romer (1994), in a model which analyses the welfare costs of trade restrictions, assumes that firms are
characterised by different fixed production costs.
7efficiency of the industry. In equilibrium there should be no new entry or exit and the
marginal firm (i= jN +1) will break even. Thus,  ( ) 0)1N(j)1N(j jj =++ βΠ  where
( )δφβ 1N jj)1N(j j +=+  is the marginal cost of the least efficient firm in the industry.
Effectively, )1N(j j +β  is the industry efficiency cut-off point. Firms whose marginal cost is
smaller than )1N(j j +β  will make positive profits, that is ( ) 0)1N(jjiji j >< +ββΠ .  Thus,
contrary to the standard  monopolistic competition model, firm heterogeneity implies that
positive profits persist in the long-run for the non-marginal firms.
The endogeneity of )1N(j j +β  implies that in this model the cost efficiency composition
of the industry is endogenous. Clearly, for any given jN , )1N(j j +β  will be larger the larger is
the degree of heterogeneity between firms δ: the more heterogeneous are firms’
technologies, the lower will be the equilibrium average efficiency of the industry. Also, note
that ceteris paribus 0j)1N(j j >∂∂ + φβ .
Using (10) and (11), the zero profit condition for the marginal firm in country j, that
is 0)1N(j j =+Π , implies
(12) σαµ
σ
λ
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
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P
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Also,  using (10) and recalling that δφβ ijji = ,  we have
(13) ( )δωφ 1NP jj)1N(j j +=+ .
Thus, for any given equilibrium market structure, the differentiated industry price in (5)
implies
(14) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) σθσλ
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 One could easily assume that a number of firms exist per efficiency type instead. This however would not
significantly affect the qualitative nature of the results.
8where θ =δ(1-σ)+1.
The total manufacturing labour requirement is given by ∫
+
=
1N
1
jiDj
j
diCL  which - using
equations (4), (7), (10) and (14) - yields the following differentiated sector aggregate labour
demand
(15) jjDj NML αω
µ
+=  .
The labour market equilibrium requires equating the exogenously given labour supply ( jL )
with the total labour demand from the two sectors, that is
(16)  DjAjj LLL += .
Given perfect competition in the homogeneous sector, the economy wide profits are
given by the aggregate differentiated industry profits  ∫
+
−==
1N
1
Djjjjij
j
LDPdiΠΠ  which,
using equations (4) and (15),  can be written as
(17)  jjj NM ασ
µΠ −= .
Equations (2)-(4), (8), and (12)-(17) characterise the general equilibrium of the
model.  Given the complexity of the algebra involved, we have used a simulation exercise to
solve the model for the following parameter values: φh=1, φf=(1.1, 1.2), σ=(2.1, 2.3,
...11.9), λ=(0, 0.003, 0.005, ....1) , α=0.001, δ=1, µ=0.7, L =1.
2.5. Analysis of the autarkic equilibrium
Solving the labour market equilibrium condition for jM  yields
(18) ( ) ( )j1j NLM αµσσ −−= − ,
9which implies that total income  only depends on jN , L , σ and µ.  Also, substituting
equations  (14) and (13) into the zero profit condition in (12) yields
(19)  ( ) ( ) σα
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Hence, (18) and (19) can be solved to determine jN   and imply that the equilibrium number
of firms is invariant to both λ and jφ . This clearly means that the number of firms in the two
countries is identical. Assume that the home country has the more efficient marginal cost
distribution, i.e. fh φφ < . The equality of the autarkic number of firms then implies that the
home country will be characterised by a higher minimum efficiency (i.e. )1N(f)1N(h fh ++ < ββ )
and will have a higher average industry efficiency.
As a result, it is obvious from equation (14) that the only difference between the two
countries’ price indexes is determined by the efficiency gap. Given that 0
P
j
j >
∂
∂
φ , the more
efficient country’s equilibrium price index is always smaller than that of the foreign country.
As is evident from Figure 1, the equilibrium number of  firms is negatively related to
σ.   The parameter σ   can be seen as reflecting the toughness of price competition. As it
increases, firms’ monopoly power and their mark up fall. As a result, cost efficiency becomes
more important for competition in the industry and a smaller number of more efficient firms
will survive in equilibrium.
Two main factors affect the differentiated good price index, the number of varieties
and the efficiency composition of the industry. From equation (14) it is obvious that when
preferences reward product diversity  (i.e. λ>0), the direct effect of the number of varieties
on the price index is negative: consumers perceive a lower price index the larger is jN .
However, jP  is also positively related to the industry’s efficiency cut-off point: the larger is
)1N(j j +β  the lower is the minimum efficiency required to survive in equilibrium and the worse
will be the efficiency structure of the industry. For λ=0, the number of varieties affects the
price index only through the marginal cost composition of the existing population of firms.
10
The assumed distribution of firms’ marginal costs implies that as the number of firms falls,
the average industry efficiency increases and the price index falls. Thus, given that 0
N j <
∂
∂
σ
,
it follows that when λ=0, 0Pj <
∂
∂
σ
. When preferences reward product diversity and λ>0, the
effect of changes in the number of firms on the price index is not unambiguous and,
consistently, 
σ∂
∂ jP
  is not monotonic. As Figure 1 illustrates, when λ>0,  
σ∂
∂ jP
 is positive
(negative)  for sufficiently small (large) values of σ.
  Figure 1  here
The intuition behind this is as follows. As σ increases (and jN  falls) the efficiency
composition of the industry improves. For λ>0 the net effect on the price index depends on
which of the efficiency and variety effects dominates. At sufficiently small values of σ, price
competition is not strong enough for the (price reducing) efficiency gains to dominate the
(price increasing) fall in the number of varieties. When σ is large,  further increases in σ will
result in a fall in jP  because price competition is strong enough for the adverse variety effect
on the price index to be more than offset by the improvement in the efficiency composition of
the industry.
Note that from (14) we obtain  0P
j
j >
∂
∂
φ  which suggests that, for all values of λ, the
more efficient country will be characterised by a lower equilibrium price index.
Finally, given that fh NN = , equation (18) implies the equality of equilibrium income
in the two countries (i.e. fh MM = ). It then follows from (15) that DfDh LL = .
To summarise,  in the autarkic equilibrium, the two countries’ differentiated sectors
produce the same number of varieties using the same total amount of labour. The different
efficiency composition of the two industries, however, is reflected in different price indexes.
Given the equality of income in the two countries, it follows from (4) that in the less efficient
country a  smaller aggregate quantity of the differentiated good will be produced  by on
average smaller firms.
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3. FREE TRADE
Trade in goods is assumed to take place in a context where transport costs and all other
barriers to trade are absent and consumers do not discriminate amongst goods produced in
different countries as, for example, in Venables (1987, 1994). Thus, the opening up of trade
leads to larger and fully integrated good markets. Labour is assumed to be immobile across
countries.
In the manufacturing sector, consumers in each country will be able to choose from
the overall number of varieties produced in the free trade market. This number is denoted by
tN , where the subscript “t” indicates trade, and is given by
(20)  tftht NNN += ,
where tjN  is the number of monopolistically competitive firms in country j.
Given the absence of transport costs and of any other factors generating market
segmentation, consumers in both countries will face the common free trade price index:
(21) ( )( ) ( ) σσσσλ −
+ +
−−
−−




+= ∫ ∫ 1
1
1N
1
1N
1
1
fi
1
hi
1/1
tt
th tf
PdiPNP .
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prices of each country’s firms under free trade5. Making use of this, (21) can be rewritten as
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Given the symmetry which characterises the demand side of the model, it can be
easily shown that the optimisation problem of consumers in the two countries yields the
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 Note that given the absence of barriers to trade, tjP  does not have an immediate economic interpretation.
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following aggregate demand for each variety σλσµ −−−= ji1t1tttji PNPMD ,  where tM  is the
integrated market income:
(22) tftht MMM +=  ,
and each country’s income is given by
(23)  tjjtj LM Π+=  .
It is straightforward to show that the optimal price rule for a firm i operating in the
integrated market will still be as in equation (10).  It follows that the profit of a typical firm i
in country j is     αβµ
σ
ωΠ σσλ
σ
−
−
=
−−−
−
1
ji
1
t
1
tttji PNM1
.
Under free trade, within each country there may not be equality between demand
( dtjA ) and supply ( stjA ) of the agricultural good. From the first stage of utility maximisation
(24) ( ) tjdtj M1A µ−= .
On the supply side of the market,  we have
(25)  AtjStj LA = ,
where AtjL  is the agricultural  sector’s total labour demand in country j.
3.1. The free trade equilibrium
As in autarky, market structure within each country is determined endogenously via free-
entry. The zero profit condition for the marginal firm in country j is given by
( ) 0)1N(j)1N(tj tjtj =++ βΠ  which yields
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where
(27)  ( )δωφ 1NP tjj)1N(j tj +=+ .
In equilibrium,
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The expenditure on the differentiated commodity in country j is given by diDPE
1N
1
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=
which, using  (28),  yields
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The total labour demand of the differentiated sector in country j is ∫
+
=
1N
1
jiDtj
tj
diCL . Using
(28) and (29), this becomes
(30) tjDtjDtj NE
1L α
ω
+= .
Subtracting  (30) from (29) yields the total equilibrium profits in country j’s differentiated
industry, that is
(31) tjDtjtj NE
1
α
σ
Π −=  .
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Finally, the total demand and supply of the agricultural good must equal to each other
across the two countries:
(32) dtfdthstfsth AAAA +=+ .
Equations (20)-(31) characterise the general equilibrium of the model6.
4. THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON INDUSTRY EFFICIENCY
Equation  (26) suggests that in the free trade equilibrium )1N(f)1N(h tfth PP ++ = , which in turn
implies the equality of the efficiency cut-off points in the two countries, i.e.
)1N(f)1N(h tfth ++ = ββ . Hence, the integration of the differentiated good market unifies the
competitive conditions within which firms operate. A firm’s competitive strength is
determined by its relative efficiency with respect to all other firms operating in the free trade
market and not only to the domestic ones. Note that given fh φφ < , the equality of the cut-
off points implies that the average industry efficiency is higher in the home than in the foreign
country. The two country-specific autarkic cut-off points and the common free trade one are
plotted together7 in Figure 2 which illustrates that )1N(f)1N(j)1N(h ftjh +++ << βββ .
   Figure 2  here
The free trade common minimum efficiency requirement is more stringent than that in the
foreign country under autarky. The opposite holds true for the home country, whose autarkic
minimum efficiency is higher than that required to survive in the integrated market. An
important result of the model is therefore that free trade worsens (improves) the efficiency
composition of the more (less) efficient country’s industry.  The reason for this is that free-
trade leads the most inefficient foreign firms to be displaced by more efficient home firms;
these home firms, however, have a marginal cost which is higher than that of the least
efficient home firm under autarky. As a result, average efficiency falls with trade in the home
country.  Clearly, this analysis casts doubt on the general validity of the widespread belief
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 Note that these equations also imply that equation (32) is satisfied.
7
 Given that the equilibrium number of firms is invariant to λ, the efficiency cut off point is not affected by it
either.
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that trade liberalisation, through competition, is always a source of industry rationalisation.
Industry rationalisation will occur if trade increases the competitive pressure. Facing on
average less efficient foreign firms reduces the competitive pressure on domestic firms and
leads to a worse efficiency composition of the industry.
It is also easy to show that the relative efficiency effects of trade are more significant
the larger is the efficiency gap between countries ( )hf φφ − . Intuitively, for the more efficient
country’s firms the competitive pressure to be efficient in the integrated market is lower the
lower is the average cost competitiveness of the foreign country’s firms. The latter, in turn,
will face a tougher price competition the  larger is their cost disadvantage.
Contrary to the constant elasticity of substitution homogeneous firms model, through
its effects on the endogenously determined minimum level of equilibrium industry efficiency,
trade affects the structure of output scales. The marginal firm’s zero-profit condition in
equation (26) yields 
)1N(j
)1N(tj
tj
tj
)1(D
+
+
−
= β
σα
 which is the same for both countries given the
common efficiency cut-off point. Hence, )1N(f)1N(j)1N(h ftjh +++ << βββ    implies that
)1N(h)1N(tj)1N(f htjf DDD +++ << : under free trade, the output scale of the marginal firm in the
more (less) efficient country is smaller (larger) than in autarky.
In sum, for the more efficient country, trade liberalisation does not result in a
“rationalised” manufacturing industry, but in a worse efficiency composition and a smaller
marginal output scale. The rationalising effects of trade liberalisation, however, occur with
respect to the less efficient country, which will experience a more efficient industry structure
and a larger marginal firm’s output scale.
The equality of the free trade efficiency cut-off  points implies
( ) ( )
δ
φ
φ /1
h
f
tfth 1N1N 



+=+ , from which it follows that tfth NN > .
Furthermore, )1N(f)1N(j)1N(h ftjh +++ << βββ  yields thjtf NNN << . Therefore,
contrary to the standard constant elasticity of substitution model where fht NNN += , in this
model it will generally be the case that fht NNN +≠ , i.e. trade changes the overall number
of varieties produced in the world economy.
5. THE PATTERN OF PRODUCTION AND TRADE SPECIALISATION
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In the free trade equilibrium there will be intra-industry trade in manufactures. The fact that
tfth NN >  already suggests that the home country, with its higher relative efficiency in the
manufacturing industry, will be relatively specialised in the production of the differentiated
good. Consistently, the home country will hold a larger share of the integrated market
expenditure on the differentiated good. Equation (29) implies
(33) 
λσ −−








=
1
tf
th
1
tf
th
Dtf
Dth
N
N
P
P
E
E
.
It is easy to show that for all values of the relevant parameters 1
P
P
tf
th < , which is plausible
since the home country has both a higher equilibrium average industry efficiency and a larger
number of firms. Thus given that 1
N
N
tf
th > , 
Dtf
Dth
E
E
 always exceeds unity. Therefore, a larger
share of the integrated market income is spent on the manufacturing good produced in the
more efficient country.
Consistently with the trade pattern thus emerged, the more efficient country will
employ a larger share of its labour endowment in manufacturing, as is clear from equation
(29), which yields ( ) ( )tfthDtfDthDtfDth NNEELL −+−=− αω  >0.
Note that, ceteris paribus, the extent of the home country’s specialisation in the
production of the differentiated good is greater the larger is σ. This is clear, considering that
when the elasticity of substitution between varieties is large, firms’ market power is small and
cost competitiveness is very important.  Finally, other things equal, the home country’s
output of the agricultural good will be smaller the larger is ( )hf φφ − , that is the extent of
specialisation will be directly related to the efficiency gap between countries. Figure 3
illustrates these points.
   Figure 3  here
6. THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF TRADE
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There are two main channels through which trade changes consumers’ welfare in this model.
These are (1) the number of varieties of the differentiated good and (2) the efficiency
structure of the industry.
Market integration increases the number of varieties available for consumption to
each set of consumers since jt NN > . The wider choice of goods implies that if there is love
of variety (i.e. λ>0) consumers will ceteris paribus perceive the free trade price index to be
lower than the autarkic one. Hence, the variety effect of market integration will contribute to
an increase in the level of  welfare8.
In the standard monopolistic competition model with identical firms, trade
unambiguously increases welfare when there is love of variety  (λ>0). However, with λ=0
consumers’ welfare would not be affected in the constant elasticity of substitution case, given
that trade would not change output scale.  In this model, instead, the endogenously
determined efficiency structure of the industry provides an additional channel through which
trade affects consumer welfare. By changing the industry efficiency cut-off point, trade
affects the price index. Thus, welfare will be affected by trade even when there is no love of
variety.
Trade has an opposite impact on the price index for the two countries’ consumers.
As we saw, the common free trade efficiency cut-off point lies between the two countries’
autarkic ones. As a result, the free trade price index reflects an average cost efficiency which
is lower (higher) than the more (less) efficient country’s autarkic one.  This implies that with
respect to autarky, the efficiency effect of trade will contribute to an increase (fall) of the
price index for consumers in the more (less) efficient country.
It follows that, for foreign consumers the move to free trade leads to an unambiguous
fall in the price index of the differentiated good, given that both the number of varieties and
efficiency effects are positive.
As far as the more efficient country is concerned,  the variety and the efficiency
effects of trade on the price index work in opposite direction. Consumers will face a lower
(higher) price index depending on whether the variety effect dominates the efficiency effect
(or vice versa). This will ultimately depend on the degree of  love of variety. If λ is
sufficiently small, the efficiency effect of trade will dominate the variety effect and the free
trade price index will be higher than the autarkic one. The opposite will happen for
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sufficiently large values of λ9.  Figure 4 plots the ratio 
t
h
P
P
 for the two limiting cases of λ=0
and λ=110.
    Figure 4  here
When λ=0, the efficiency effect of trade dominates the variety effect and 
t
h
P
P
<1. For λ=1,
the variety effect dominates and 
t
h
P
P
>1.
 To assess the overall welfare effects of trade for the two countries we need to
examine their indirect utility functions. From equation  (1) the autarkic and free trade indirect
utilities are given by
(34)    
,PMV
PMV
ttjtj
jjj
µ
µ
−
−
=
=
from which we obtain   
µ−




=
tj
j
tj
j
tj
j
P
P
M
M
V
V
.
To determine the overall welfare effect of trade we need to assess how it affects total
income.  Figure 5 plots the ratio 
tj
j
Π
Π
. Clearly, the home country’s total profits increase with
trade, while the foreign country’s fall11. Given (23), it follows that  
tf
f
M
M
>1 while 
th
h
M
M
<1.
Thus, as far as the foreign country is concerned, trade has a positive welfare effect through
the price index but a negative one through total income. Our numerical simulations suggest
                                                                                                                                                                         
8
 Note that the number of variety welfare effect of trade is symmetric for the two countries since jt NN −  is
the same for both countries.
9
 In general, it can be shown that for any given λ<1,  
t
h
P
P
>1 will be more likely to hold the smaller is σ.
10
 The two curves are plotted on independent scales, with λ=0 on the right hand side axis and λ=1 on the left
hand side axis.
11
 It is straightforward to show that this holds for all values of λ.
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that the net welfare effect for the foreign country is positive for all values of the relevant
parameters.
Figure 5  here
Instead, with respect to the home country, the results suggest that adverse welfare effects
may occur. For the more efficient country market integration can be welfare reducing for
sufficiently low values of the degree of love of variety  and of the elasticity of substitution
between varieties.  As we saw, income always increases as a result of  trade liberalisation.
Hence, in those circumstances in which 
t
h
P
P
>1, the home country’s welfare is increased by
trade. This will happen for a sufficiently high degree of love of variety  (λ). When λ is
sufficiently small, the adverse efficiency effect of trade will dominate the number of variety
effect  and will result in 
t
h
P
P
 being less than unity. Clearly, for any given λ, the welfare loss
will be larger (or the welfare gain smaller) the smaller is the elasticity of  substitution
between varieties. This is obvious, given that a small σ reflects a high degree of monopoly
power and will therefore result in an enhanced adverse efficiency effect of trade on the more
efficient country’s market structure. Hence, the smaller are σ and λ, the more likely will the
effect of trade on price dominate its positive effect on income, thus resulting in a negative
overall welfare effect. Figure 6 illustrate such cases.
Figure 6  here
To summarise, the less efficient country will always benefit from trade liberalisation.
However, market integration may adversely affect the more efficient country’s consumers
who will face a higher price index for the differentiated good, due to the deterioration of
their industry’s efficiency relative to autarky. If variety per se is highly valued (λ is large), the
welfare impact of a higher price index will be dominated by the positive welfare effects of
increased product variety. If the degree of love of variety  (λ) is sufficiently low, however,
the higher price index will dominate the increased product diversity effect of market
integration, thus leading to a overall welfare loss.
20
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed the implications of technical heterogeneity amongst firms and
countries for the effects of trade. With technical heterogeneity, free-entry generates a
mechanism of competitive selection which leads to the endogenous determination of industry
efficiency. By affecting the competitive pressure characterising the environment within which
firms operate, trade changes the minimum level of efficiency required to survive in
equilibrium. As a result, the cost structure of the free trade population of firms will, on
average, be characterised by an efficiency level which is lower (higher) than that in the more
(less) efficient country’s autarkic equilibrium.
The efficiency effects of market integration constitute an additional channel through
which trade affects welfare. In a constant elasticity of substitution homogeneous firms model
with love of variety, trade liberalisation would be unambiguously welfare improving.
However, in the absence of preference for diversity, consumer welfare would be unaffected
by trade. Instead, in the model developed here market integration affects welfare even in the
absence of love of variety by changing the efficiency structure of the industry and, through it,
the price index.
The results cast doubt on the efficacy of trade liberalisation in generating welfare
gains based on its rationalising effects on industries. Indeed, depending on the toughness of
price competition and on the degree of love of variety, the fall in efficiency can be sufficient
to cause a net welfare loss in the more efficient country. The less efficient country, however,
always gain from trade liberalisation.
To some extent, of course, the results of this paper depend on the functional forms
adopted. Nevertheless, they suggest that circumstances may arise in which the existence of
technical heterogeneity can cause  adverse welfare effects. Thus, the results question the
view emerging from the literature that the introduction of a monopolistically competitive
market structure may strengthen the case for free trade.
Finally, the relaxation of the assumption of firm homogeneity raises interesting
theoretical issues and suggests new avenues for research. In order to highlight its most
immediate implications, in this paper we have followed a modelling strategy which allows for
as direct a comparison as possible with the existing literature. One important theoretical
point to notice, however, is that the existence of inter-firm efficiency gaps questions the
plausibility of assuming away strategic interaction between firms, with firms not taking
21
account of their pricing decisions on the industry price level. Given the persistence in
equilibrium of supernormal profits, one of the implications of this would be the emergence of
strategic trade policy considerations.
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    Figure 1. Autarkic number of firms and home price index (λ=1)
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     Figure2. Auta rkic versus trade efficiency cut-off points  (λ=0)
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Figure 3.   Free-trade agricultural output (λ=0)
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Figure 5.  Autarky versus trade: Home and foreign profits
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Figure 6. Welfare effects of trade on the home country ( 2.1f =φ )
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